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1. Administrative procedure and access rights 
Administrative procedures rationalise public action in various ways. They channel 
information, enable the decision-maker to weigh competing legally protected interests, and 
allow scrutiny of the choices made.2 They also provide access points along the way, to 
citizens and persons affected, be it in the form of access to information or access to 
decision-making. In this way, procedures structure the relationships between decision-
makers and legally affected persons and citizens. The extent to which they do depends on 
the breadth of access rights. The rationale of access rights also varies. Access rights may be 
constructed essentially with a view to ensuring compliance with law by giving access to 
holders of legally protected interests in a way that both allows them to protect those interests 
and collaborate with the decision-maker by providing information and views to which the 
administration would possibly not have had access otherwise. But they may also be designed 
in a way that would ensure that any citizen who wishes to participate has a voice in a given 
decision-making procedure and has equal opportunities of influencing outcomes.3  
These two ways of conceiving access rights – i.e. informed by a rule of law rationale, or by a 
democratic rationale – are different but intimately related, in particular when it comes to 
procedures leading to the adoption of administrative rules. If one stresses the procedural 
protection of rights and legally protected interests, one ought to construct access rights in 
the light of legal administrative relationships, i.e. the legal bonds that, during a given 
decision-making procedure and following the adoption of the act, link the several legal 
spheres in which rights, privileges, duties and charges emerge as a result of the outcome of 																																																								
1 As indicated in the footnotes below, this text is based on ideas developed in previous writings of the author.  
2 See, further, E. Schmidt-Assmann (2008), “Pluralidade de Estruturas y Funciones de Los Procedimientos 
Administrativos en el Derecho Alemán, Europeo e Internacional”, in J. Barnes (ed), La Transformación del 
Procedimiento Administrativo, Sevilla: Global Law Press, pp. 75-139, at pp. 76-77. 
3 J. Mendes (2011) “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon: a legal view on Article 11 TEU”, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 48. No. 6, pp. 1849-1878, at p. 1862. A third rationale of participation, focused on the 
benefits that participation may bring to policy outcomes as well as to the acceptance and compliance with the 
decisions adopted, arguably does not require the enshrinement of procedural rights. 
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the procedure.4 If however access rights have a “democratic inspiration”,5 they should be 
granted to the public without further specification, accompanied by procedural guarantees 
that ensure equal treatment irrespective of the interests they voice. In this case, the main 
purpose of access rights is to ensure a wide debate on solutions proposed by administrative 
decision-makers, rather than to enable the procedural protection of rights and legally 
protected interests. Now, even in theory there may only be a thin line diving these two 
rationales of access rights. In fact, the protection of one’s legal sphere is an important 
dimension of individual freedom. In this light, access rights that ensure the procedural 
protection of substantive rights and legally protected interests of those concerned by 
administrative action is also a requirement of democracy. Access rights enable the protection 
of rights and legally protected interests that could be neglected in the political process.6 But 
even if the two rationales partially overlap, the way procedural rules are designed would in 
principle still differ. Those that predominantly intend to ensure the procedural protection of 
affected persons will limit access to holders of rights and legally protected interests. Ancillary 
procedural guarantees – such as the duty to give reasons – should be constructed in a way 
that also pays heed to those legally affected interests.7 On the contrary, as already pointed 
out, those that predominantly intend to ensure an exchange of views ought to involve the 
citizen, or the public at large, rather than the legally interested person and, crucially, ensure 
equal opportunities of influencing the outcome. In particular, due consideration ought to be 
given to those who disagree with the preferred orientation of the decision-maker and to 
those who, according to the latter’s preferences, would be excluded from the procedure.8 
Beyond theoretical niceties, however, even in the cases in which the procedural rules are 
clearly designed in one or the other way, those seeking access to procedural rules will most 
likely use them for their own benefit. Decision-makers and Courts may – or may not – find 
enough reasons to prevent the use of procedural rules with a purpose different from the one 																																																								
4 In more detail, see J. Mendes (2011), Participation in EU Rule-Making. A Rights-based Approach, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
5  J. Rivero (1965) “À propos des métamorphoses de l’administration d’aujourd’hui: démocratie et 
administration », in Mélanges offerts à René Savatier, Paris, Dalloz, pp. 821-833, at p. 822, 828. 
6 Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit., p. 1864. See further J. R. Pennock (1979), 
Democratic Political Theory (Princeton University Press), pp. 441-49. 
7 One could read in this light the requirement according to which the statement of reasons should also “enable 
the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons” for the measure adopted (a requirement that is intrinsically 
linked with facilitating judicial review – e.g. Judgment in Acino v Commission, Case C-269/13 P, EU:C:2014:255, 
para. 120). 
8 Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit., p. 1862. 
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that grounded its establishment. In the EU, the possibility to resort to the regulation on 
access to documents to circumvent access restrictions established by sector rules on access 
to the file by third parties in competition cases illustrates how the boundaries between 
different rationales may blur. 9  Rule of law and democratic rationales of access rights – 
already partially overlapping – may blend even more in practice. 
 
2. Administrative democracy? 
It may be tempting to construct a claim of administrative democracy on the basis of access 
rights to the administrative procedure. In fact, administrative democracy has been mostly 
understood to rely on mechanisms and procedures that ensure a link between citizens and 
the administration beyond those that representative democracy allows for.10 Access rights 
would be necessary to uphold the idea of democracy in the development of the 
administrative function for two main reasons. First, in the realm of administration, “the link 
between the original holder of [democratic] power and [the person] that in fact exercises this 
power is so distant that it becomes wholly abstract”.11  Secondly, the distance between the 
origin of public power and its purpose allows a great variety of modalities that serve the 
purpose for which the administrative power was attributed.12  Access rights would allow 
citizens and their representative associations to engage in public discussion and debates with 
public entities on the concrete direction and in the implementation of public policies.13 The 
argument would be particularly fitting in those sites of power where representative 
democracy is weaker (the EU) or inexistent (international organizations). 
The risks of too quickly reading “democracy” in access rights are however too important to 
be overlooked. Access rights are likely to be used by powerful corporate actors to influence 
decision-making for their own benefit and in detriment of weaker legally protected interests. 																																																								
9  The relationship between access to file, as provided in sector specific EU law, on the one hand, and 
Regulation 1049/2011, on the other, has been widely debated following the judgment of the General Court in 
Verein für Konsumenteninformation (Judgment of 13 April 2005, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission, Case 
T-2/03, EU:T:2005:125). See, e.g., P. Leino (2011), “Just a little sunshine in the rain: The 2010 case law of the 
Court of Justice on access to documents”, Common Market Law Review, pp. 1241-1246. The subsequent case law 
of the ECJ has curbed the resort to the access to documents regulation in these cases: see Judgment in 
Commission v. Agrofert, Case C-477/10 P, EU:C:2012:394, para 57-64, and Judgment in Commission v. Éditions 
Odile Jacob, C-404/10 P, EU:C:2013:808,106-198, and 121-122. 
10 J.-B. Auby (2011), “Rémarques préliminaires sur la démocratie administrative” in Revue française d'administration 
publique, n° 137-138, pp. 13-19, at p. 16. 
11 Rivero, “A propos des métamorphoses de l’administration d’aujourd’hui…”, cit., p. 822, 828. 
12 Rivero, “A propos des métamorphoses de l’administration d’aujourd’hui…”, cit., p. 829. 
13 Ibidem. 
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Even if that were not the case, it is most probably “representative organizations” – rather 
than citizens – that will access procedures; or, at least, these are the ones that are most likely 
to influence the outcomes, assuming that their capacity to engage in the debate that the 
decision-maker may wish to open is greater than that of the average citizen (think of 
information resources). At the very least, if there are no criteria by which one can establish 
the representative character of these organizations, the democratic value of their 
participation in the administrative procedure can hardly be defended.14 Such criteria are a 
conditio sine qua non to give a democratic meaning to the input of interest representatives in 
decision-making procedures. Without them, and without further requirements of equality of 
access and treatment, the democratic potential of participation of representative 
organizations can and should be fundamentally contested.15  
Access to decision-making procedures outside the mechanisms of representative democracy 
can only entail a promise of democratic legitimation if upheld by procedural rules that ensure 
minimum conditions thereof.16 Procedural rules are needed to establish the necessary (but 
not sufficient) conditions that make democratic participation possible. The concrete way in 
which access rights are used may depend on how stringent the procedural rules are designed 
and, especially, on how decision-makers effectively apply them, as well as on the 
administrative and possibly also judicial mechanisms of overseeing their application.  
We can now return to the point made above. The distance between the original holders of 
democratic legitimacy and holders of administrative power does require looking for 
complementary sources of democratic input beyond those offered by institutional 
mechanisms of representative democracy. Access to decision-making procedures can be one 
of those sources, if duly channelled by appropriate procedural rules that ensure the 
minimum conditions thereof. As a complementary possible source of legitimacy, access rights 
would contribute to making more effective “the primary representative and democratic 
																																																								
14 Skeptical about the democratic role of organised interests in the EU, see B. Kohler-Koch (2012), “Post-
Maastricht Civil Society and Participatory Democracy”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, No 7, pp. 809-24, 
at pp. 813-4. 
15 See, e.g P. Allott (2002) “European Governance and the Re-branding of Democracy”, European Law Review, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 60-71, according to whom “governance by governments in collusion with something which 
they call civil society is a death-wish for democracy” (p. 68).  
16 See further, Mendes “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit.. 
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connection of legitimation”.17 These links will be different in different constitutional settings. 
So also the space given to complementary sources of democracy should vary.  
 
3. The European Union 
3.1. Between normative promise and practical neglect 
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that concretise democracy as one of the founding 
principles of the Union purport the creation of opportunities of participation – by “citizens 
and representative associations”  (Article 11(1) TEU), by “civil society” (Article 11(2) TEU), 
by “parties concerned” (Article 11(3) TEU) – in addition to the representative links 
established between the citizens and the Union via the European Parliament and between 
the Member States and the Union via the European Council and the Council (Article 10(2) 
TEU). Irrespective of the concrete meaning one may attribute to the apparently incoherent 
provisions of Article 11(1) to (3) TEU, one may argue that, from a formal perspective, the 
democratic legitimacy of the legal acts of the Union cannot anymore rely only on a 
combination of the different institutions representing the “Union interest”, the Member 
States and the citizens. At the same time, Article 10 TEU stresses the fundamental principle 
that the Court had stated in Atlanta in the mid-1990s, according to which “people should 
take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly”.18 
What sense should then one make of Article 11 TEU?  
As argued elsewhere, Article 11 TEU enshrines participation as a constitutionally imposed 
duty and it defines normative standards that ought to shape participation procedures; but it 
also detaches participation from the predominant meaning that has prevailed in institutional 
practices. 19  Unless Article 11 is to remain effectively devoid of meaning, its provisions 
require a different approach to the institutional practices of participatory governance that 
have prevailed hitherto.20 Participatory democracy is a now intended to be a complementary 
source of the Union democracy. As such, participation can no longer merely be an 																																																								
17 As stressed by the German Constitutional Court in its ruling on the Lisbon Treaty (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 
30.6.2009), para 297. This Court’s analysis was set against the background of its criticisms regarding the 
possibilities in the EU of representative democracy, the core content of which are “free and equal elections” 
(para. 270-1). The ruling has been criticized for its narrow, state-like views on democracy in the EU (see, e.g. D. 
Thym (2009) “In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 1795-1822, at pp. 1812ff). 
18 Judgment of 11 December 1996, Atlanta and others v Council and Commission, T-521/93, EU:T:1996:184, para 
71.  
19 See, in detail, Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit. 
20 The analysis in Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit., remains up to date. 
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instrument of policy delivery. Nevertheless, the conceptual link between Articles 10 and 11 
TEU is unclear, as it remains largely unclear what complementarity may mean or require 
beyond the minimal observation that representative democracy does not exhaust the sources 
of Union democracy. Access rights – with the caveats indicated above – ought at least be 
considered as one way of concretising the indications of Article 11 TEU, in particular in the 
areas where the representative institutions indicated in Article 10 TEU are deprived of 
effective decision-making power, or have only limited formal possibilities of influencing the 
content of decisions. The same reasons that would advocate administrative democracy apply 
here, but also do the same risks and limitations. In view of Article 11, the principle according 
to which the exercise of power should be exercised at the EU level through the intermediary 
of a representative assembly is decidedly misplaced to deny participation rights in the 
adoption of non-legislative acts. 21  Participation could become a source of democratic 
legitimacy in a transnational polity that is undoubtedly made of States but whose decisions 
directly affects their nationals, where there are structural and functional interdependencies 
between the different levels of decision-making that mechanisms of representative 
democracy have failed to capture. Yet, how access rights can effectively acquire such a role is 
far from obvious. It will crucially depend on how they are designed and implemented. 
We are presently faced with a situation in which the status quo is no longer normatively 
sustainable, even if only assessed in legal-constitutional terms in view of the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions on democracy; but where the concrete implications of these provisions remain 
largely ignored, both in the academic debate and in the institutional practice. The 
Commission’s position in this respect is paradigmatic. When asked by a member of the 
European Parliament “How does the Commission intend to flesh out Article 11 of the 
Treaty on European Union, which makes provisions for participative democracy? What 
measures are being prepared in connection with this Article?”,22 Mr Barroso replied in the 
name of the Commission: “L’article 11 prévoit les principes à mettre en œuvre par les 
institutions en ce qui concerne la démocratie participative. Pour sa part la Commission a très 
largement anticipé dans sa pratique (....). L’initiative citoyenne, qui est le seul instrument législatif prévu 
																																																								
21 As the Court held in Atlanta, cit.. 
22 Question for written answer to the Commission, Gilles Pargneaux (S&D), E-005223/2012, 23 May 2012 
(available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012-
005223&format=XML&language=EN). 
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par l’article 11 TFUE, est opérationelle depuis avril 2012.”23 The Commission thereby has 
simply chosen to relegate the provisions of Article 11 TEU to mere rhetorical proclamation. 
The Commission has indeed set up mechanisms of participation way in advance of the 
Lisbon Treaty, but to read these through the lens of democracy dangerously dresses 
practices directed a policy delivery with a veneer of legitimacy they are deprived of. They 
lack the minimum requirements of voice and equal treatment indicated above.  
 
3.2. Administrative procedure and complementarity: a minimal proposal 
Procedural rules that would ensure those requirements could be a means to ensure that the 
Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies conduct their work in a way that is 
compatible with Article 11 TEU. Thus far, the institutions have largely ignored the external 
dimension of procedures that would have allowed them to structure their relationships with 
citizens and representative associations in compliance with the normative requirements of 
Article 11 TEU, both those explicitly determined (public exchange of views, open and 
transparent dialogue, broad consultations) and those that are inherent in the normative shift 
that Article 11 TEU purports.24  
One important instance that illustrates where the EU institutions stand in this matter is the 
overhaul of the procedural legal regime of implementing acts and delegated acts, in the light 
of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.25 The procedures leading to the adoption of these acts have 
been approached in EU law and practice largely as a matter of the institutions, of the way 
they relate to each other and to the Member States. When formalised, they are 
predominantly directed at combining the intervention of the EU institutions, agencies, and 
committees, in a way that is, first, compatible with the Treaty; secondly, and crucially, that is 
consonant with the interpretation that each institution has of their institutional prerogatives 
under the Treaty; and, thirdly, that ensures the involvement of those who will be 
determinant in the implementation of the rules adopted (chiefly, the Member States). The 
Commission guidelines for the adoption of delegated acts does refer to the consultation of 																																																								
23 Réponse donnée par M. Barroso au nom de la Commission, E-005223/2012, 6 July 2012 (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-005223&language=EN), emphasis 
added. On the Commission’s practices of consultation, see the observations in Mendes “Participation in 
rulemaking: the European Union” in this volume. 
24 See Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon”, cit.. 
25 The argument is developed in J. Mendes, “The making of delegated and implementing acts: legitimacy 
beyond inter-institutional balances” in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng (eds.) Comitology and Commission Rule-
making after Lisbon: The New Chapter, forthcoming (OUP). It is only summarised here. 
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“stakeholders”; yet, not only the terms of consultation are fully determined by the 
Commission in a way that does not ensure a minimum threshold that could support a 
democratic meaning to consultation procedures, but also the Commission’s main concern 
when addressing such consultations is to protect its institutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the 
Council. 26  In what concerns implementing acts, the Standard Rules of Procedure for 
Comitology Committees envisage that the committee’s chair (a Commission representative) 
“may decide to invite representatives of other third parties or other experts” as observers 
who cannot be present nor participate in the voting of the committee; a simply majority of 
the component members of the committee may object.27  Hence, the very possibility of 
participation and, crucially, the choice on who to involve are fully dependent on the 
Commission representative and on the members of the committee (Member State 
representatives) involved in the procedure. The relatively exclusive way in which 
participation would occur, if at all – attendance of committee meetings – indicates that 
opening up decision-making to external debate and scrutiny was unlikely the reason behind 
this provision. An external dimension of the procedures that would provide access to 
citizens or persons affected, in a way that would be informed by the provisions of Article 11 
TEU, is therefore fully absent. 
Nevertheless, one thing is to verify that the institutions continue to ignore the normative 
shift that Article 11 TEU postulates, quite another is to indicate how procedural rules could 
be a complementary source of democratic legitimacy of the legal acts of the Union – or, 
specifically, in the example given, of delegated and implementing acts. As defended above, to 
fulfill this purpose, procedural rules that would support participation would at least need to 
ensure voice and equal treatment. However, these requirements merely define the minimum 
threshold beyond which access to decision-making procedures can acquire a democratic 
meaning. Designing concrete rules implies struggling with complex trade-offs and deciding 
on costs and imbalances.28 These rules would typically need to cover three aspects: notice of 
the act that opens the procedure to external scrutiny, opportunity to participation within an 																																																								
26 Commission, Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon – Delegated Acts – Guidelines for the Services of the 
Commission, para 96; Council of the European Union – General Secretariat, Initiative to complement the 
Common Understanding on delegated acts as regards the consultation of experts, Doc. 6774/14 JUR 99-
DELACT33-INST 121-PE 102, Brussels 21 February 2014, para. 4. 
27 Article 7(3) and (4) of the Standard Rules of Procedure for Committees (OJ C 206, 12/07/2011, p. 11–13), 
emphasis added. 
28 For one proposal intended to start the debate, see the ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative 
Procedure, Book II (Rule-making), available at www.reneual.eu. 
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adequate timeframe, and justification of the final choices in view of the interests voiced. All 
these requirements involve costs, but the latter is perhaps the most problematic: the 
decision-maker ought to explain whether and how it took into account the comments it 
received. It may disregard some or many as irrelevant, but according to which criteria? One 
answer may be: those criteria defined in the law that the decision-maker is intended to 
implement. Administrative decisions, whether of general or individual scope, ought to 
pursue the range of public interests that the ‘parent’ act defined as legally protected. In this 
light, the administrative decision-maker should assess the pertinence of the comments 
received via a participatory procedure on the basis of the extent to which they contribute to 
a better representation and composition of the interests the legislator set as goals in the 
given instance. Administrative procedures would thus link the concrete regulatory choices of 
administrators back to the legal framework under which they act. Participatory procedures 
would be a means of ensuring that the decision-maker has a proper representation of the 
legally protected interests affected by its decisions.29  
From this perspective, participation of persons concerned or of the public would enhance 
representative democracy insofar as it frames the choices of the Commission (or of the 
Council, in the exceptional cases of Article 291 TFEU) according to the law. This is a 
minimal way of understanding complementarity. One would object that it amounts to 
nothing more than ensuring the legality of administrative action. While legality is a necessary 
condition of democratic administrative action,30 there are possibly more suitable means of 
ensuring it. Yet, legality means here more than simple respect or faithful implementation of 
the meaning of law; it means discovery of the meaning of the law that binds the administration 
via procedures that, if ensuring equality of access and treatment of the participants, have at 
least a “democratic inspiration” by which citizens and persons legally concerned are involved 
not as subjects of a power exercised “in secret”, or as holders of resources that are valued by 
the administration, but as persons that are given a voice in the administration of public 
affairs.31 
																																																								
29 Also in Mendes, “The making of delegated and implementing acts”, cit.. 
30 Rivero, “A propos des métamorphoses de l’administration d’aujourd’hui…”, cit., p. 825. 
31 Rivero, “A propos des métamorphoses de l’administration d’aujourd’hui…”, cit., p. 822. 
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In the case of delegated acts, in addition, participatory procedures could qualify the general 
claim that procedures support legislative control.32 One could envisage a situation in which 
the information gathered by participants could be used by the Parliament to strengthen its 
control over the Commission’s choices, thus possibly balancing the current weaknesses of 
the existing controls based on Article 290 TFEU.33  More generally, participation in the 
making of delegated and implementing acts would allow the legislator to follow the process 
of making of rules and possibly influence their development. 34  It would enhance the 
possibility of public scrutiny over these decision-making procedures.  
																																																								
32 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987), “Administrative procedures as instruments of political control”, 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 3 No. 2, and Schmidt-Assmann, Teoria General Del Derecho 
Administrativo como Sistema, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2003, pp. 27ff, and 359ff. 
33  This point is also made in Mendes, “The making of delegated and implementing acts”, cit., where those 
weaknesses are pointed out. 
34 S. Rose-Ackerman, S. Egidy, J. Fowkes, “The Political Economy of the Law of Lawmaking:  The United 
States in Comparative Perspective”, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Comparative Administrative Law and 
Regulation, George Washington University Law School, January 31-February 1, 2014, Washington DC, p. 7, 
referring to procedures in general. 
